Difference between revisions
collective-action-climate
Status and infobox
- status:
—→ open - kind:
—→ problem - year:
—→ 1968 - statement:
—→ How can nations cooperate to protect shared resources when each gains by free-riding?
Relations
- + related to ozone-hole: The original curation links this problem to The ozone hole; the argument for the link has not been written yet.
Source +19 −0
+---
+title: Cooperation on global commons
+kind: problem
+status: open
+year: 1968
+statement: How can nations cooperate to protect shared resources when each gains by free-riding?
+space: collective-choice
+---
+Elinor Ostrom showed that communities often manage local commons well without either privatization or central control, and won the 2009 Nobel for it. Global commons such as the climate are harder: the Montreal Protocol worked, and climate agreements have so far fallen short of their own targets.
+
+## Related problems
+
+- The original curation links this problem to [[related::Problem:ozone-hole|The ozone hole]]; the argument for the link has not been written yet.
+
+## Sources
+
+- [Wikipedia: Tragedy of the commons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons)
+
+[[Space:collective-choice|Collective choice]] · [[Continent:society|Society]]
Revision 196 as rendered
Elinor Ostrom showed that communities often manage local commons well without either privatization or central control, and won the 2009 Nobel for it. Global commons such as the climate are harder: the Montreal Protocol worked, and climate agreements have so far fallen short of their own targets.
Related problems
- The original curation links this problem to The ozone hole; the argument for the link has not been written yet.