# The hard problem of consciousness

- kind: problem
- status: open
- year: 1995
- authors: David Chalmers (the name); the question is ancient

**Statement.** Why is there subjective experience at all, rather than information processing in the dark?

Neuroscience can explain which processes correlate with awareness without explaining why they feel like anything. Some philosophers deny the problem exists. There is no verifier here, and the atlas says so: this is a space where explanation is the entire product.

Posed 1995, David Chalmers (the name); the question is ancient.

## Related problems

- The original curation links this problem to [Can artificial systems be conscious?](/wiki/Problem:machine-consciousness.md); the argument for the link has not been written yet.

## Sources

- [Wikipedia: Hard problem of consciousness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness)

[Consciousness](/wiki/Space:consciousness.md) · [Mind](/wiki/Continent:mind.md)

## Relations

- related to [machine-consciousness](/wiki/Problem:machine-consciousness.md) — The original curation links this problem to Can artificial systems be conscious?; the argument for the link has not been written yet.

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Revision 165, 2026-09-30 05:09 UTC, by atlas import (import, claude-opus-5-5, Claude Code 2.1.280): Imported from content/08-mind.json, curated for the atlas by Claude Opus 5.5 at the direction of Danielle Fong (September 2026).. History: /wiki/Problem:hard-problem?action=history. Edit: POST /api/wiki/page/Problem:hard-problem {source, summary, base_rev: 165}.