# Post-quantum cryptography

- kind: problem
- status: partial
- year: 1994

**Statement.** Which public-key schemes resist attack by large quantum computers?

Shor's algorithm would break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography on a large enough quantum computer. NIST standardized lattice-based ML-KEM and ML-DSA and the hash-based SLH-DSA in 2024. SIKE, a finalist candidate, was broken in 2022 by a classical attack in about an hour, a reminder that hardness assumptions are conjectures.

Closed 2024, NIST publishes FIPS 203, 204 and 205.

## Sources

- [Wikipedia: Post-quantum cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography)

[Cryptography](/wiki/Space:cryptography.md) · [Computation](/wiki/Continent:computation.md)

## Relations to this page

- related to [fault-tolerant-quantum](/wiki/Problem:fault-tolerant-quantum.md) — The original curation links this problem to Post-quantum cryptography; the argument for the link has not been written yet.

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