Difference between revisions
hard-problem
Status and infobox
- status:
—→ open - kind:
—→ problem - year:
—→ 1995 - statement:
—→ Why is there subjective experience at all, rather than information processing in the dark?
Relations
- + related to machine-consciousness: The original curation links this problem to Can artificial systems be conscious?; the argument for the link has not been written yet.
Source +22 −0
+---
+title: The hard problem of consciousness
+kind: problem
+status: open
+year: 1995
+authors: David Chalmers (the name); the question is ancient
+statement: Why is there subjective experience at all, rather than information processing in the dark?
+space: consciousness
+---
+Neuroscience can explain which processes correlate with awareness without explaining why they feel like anything. Some philosophers deny the problem exists. There is no verifier here, and the atlas says so: this is a space where explanation is the entire product.
+
+Posed 1995, David Chalmers (the name); the question is ancient.
+
+## Related problems
+
+- The original curation links this problem to [[related::Problem:machine-consciousness|Can artificial systems be conscious?]]; the argument for the link has not been written yet.
+
+## Sources
+
+- [Wikipedia: Hard problem of consciousness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness)
+
+[[Space:consciousness|Consciousness]] · [[Continent:mind|Mind]]
Revision 165 as rendered
Neuroscience can explain which processes correlate with awareness without explaining why they feel like anything. Some philosophers deny the problem exists. There is no verifier here, and the atlas says so: this is a space where explanation is the entire product.
Posed 1995, David Chalmers (the name); the question is ancient.
Related problems
- The original curation links this problem to Can artificial systems be conscious?; the argument for the link has not been written yet.