Difference between revisions
post-quantum
Status and infobox
- status:
—→ partial - kind:
—→ problem - year:
—→ 1994 - statement:
—→ Which public-key schemes resist attack by large quantum computers?
Source +17 −0
+---
+title: Post-quantum cryptography
+kind: problem
+status: partial
+year: 1994
+statement: Which public-key schemes resist attack by large quantum computers?
+space: cryptography
+---
+Shor's algorithm would break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography on a large enough quantum computer. NIST standardized lattice-based ML-KEM and ML-DSA and the hash-based SLH-DSA in 2024. SIKE, a finalist candidate, was broken in 2022 by a classical attack in about an hour, a reminder that hardness assumptions are conjectures.
+
+Closed 2024, NIST publishes FIPS 203, 204 and 205.
+
+## Sources
+
+- [Wikipedia: Post-quantum cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography)
+
+[[Space:cryptography|Cryptography]] · [[Continent:computation|Computation]]
Revision 72 as rendered
Shor's algorithm would break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography on a large enough quantum computer. NIST standardized lattice-based ML-KEM and ML-DSA and the hash-based SLH-DSA in 2024. SIKE, a finalist candidate, was broken in 2022 by a classical attack in about an hour, a reminder that hardness assumptions are conjectures.
Closed 2024, NIST publishes FIPS 203, 204 and 205.